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Reports News from the GAO Reports News from the GAO. https://www.gao.gov/rss/reports.xml Fri, 16 Oct 2026 10:25:13 -0400 GAO https://www.gao.gov/themes/custom/gao_uswds/img/gao-logo-rss.gif Reports News from the GAO https://www.gao.gov/rss/reports.xml Feed provided by GAO. Critical Minerals: Limited Available Information on the Full Extent of Foreign Investment in Mining on Federal Lands https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-27-108094 What GAO Found The U.S critical mineral supply chain faces numerous constraints, including the need for substantial capital investment and limited domestic processing capacity. The U.S. exports large quantities of domestically extracted ore to Canada, Mexico, and China, among other countries. Copper Mine on Federal Lands The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Forest Service oversee hardrock mines on federal land. As of February 2026, there were 632 approved hardrock mining plans of operation on federal land. The 1872 Mining Law generally requires mining claimants to be U.S. citizens or business entities incorporated in the U.S. Foreign businesses can meet this requirement by having a U.S. subsidiary serve as the claimant. While there is limited available information on the full extent of foreign investment in mining on federal lands and parent-subsidiary relationships, GAO reviewed ownership information of 43 claimants and operators associated with critical mineral mines on federal lands. GAO determined ownership for 32 of those companies and found that 14 were subsidiaries of foreign entities. GAO found that none of the 14 had Chinese-owned parent companies, but in at least two cases, Chinese entities had financial interest in the foreign parent companies. The 1872 Mining Law does not contain a provision requiring BLM or Forest Service to collect information on foreign parent companies nor does it require claimants or operators to submit information regarding foreign ownership. However, other federal agencies have some authorities and processes to identify foreign investment in mining. For example, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, chaired by the Department of the Treasury, can review foreign investment in mining as it relates to potential national security concerns. Why GAO Did This Study Critical minerals are essential to the economic and national security of the United States. These minerals, including copper, lithium, and zinc, are key components in advanced technologies and have vulnerable supply chains. As demand for these minerals increases, U.S. access to critical minerals has become a key topic in domestic policymaking and international relations. Recently, the administration and Congressional entities have expressed concerns over U.S. dependence on imports and the role of potential adversary nations, such as the People’s Republic of China (China), in the U.S. supply chain of critical minerals. Most critical minerals that can be mined in the U.S. are obtained through hardrock mining, some of which occurs on federal lands. However, policymakers have raised questions about the full amount and extent of foreign investment in those mines. This report provides information on hardrock mining that occurs on federal lands, foreign investment in mining on federal lands, and steps federal agencies take to identify foreign investment. It also provides information on the amount of extracted critical minerals exported from the U.S. from 2019 through 2025. GAO reviewed ownership information using a variety of sources for 43 claimants and operators associated with critical mineral mines, analyzed federal laws, and interviewed officials. In a related report (GAO-27-108196), GAO reports on BLM’s role in collecting citizenship information from mining claimants. For more information, contact Dr. Nagla'a El-Hodiri at elhodirin@gao.gov. Fri, 16 Oct 2026 07:40:00 -0400 /products/gao-27-108094 2027-2032 Strategic Plan: Serving Congress and the Nation https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-27-900655 GAO’s Strategic Plan Goals and Objectives form the foundation of the agency’s strategic plan and lay out our long-term strategies to accomplish our goals. For more information, contact Stephen Sanford at SanfordS@gao.gov. Fri, 16 Oct 2026 08:38:20 -0400 /products/gao-27-900655 Tax Filing: IRS Should Enhance Ghost Preparer Identification and Compliance Efforts in a Comprehensive Preparer Strategy https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-27-108176 What GAO Found Ghost preparers are paid tax preparers who do not comply with requirements to identify themselves on tax returns they prepare for others. Ghost preparers may intentionally leave identifying information off to get away with filing fraudulent income tax returns, stealing taxpayers’ refunds, and stealing taxpayers’ identities. Courts have ordered individual ghost preparers to pay millions in restitution to the government, but according to Internal Revenue Service (IRS) officials, the total effect of ghost preparers is likely greater, in part, because ghost preparers are difficult to detect. IRS maintains some data on identified ghost preparers, but the systems IRS uses to track ghost preparer cases and outcomes are not connected and have limitations that impede their usefulness. As a result, IRS does not know how many ghost preparers it has identified, investigated, and addressed. Better understanding existing data, including its limitations, would help IRS direct enforcement resources and protect taxpayers from fraudulent returns or stolen refunds. IRS identifies and addresses ghost preparers through data analysis, referrals, taxpayer education, and enforcement actions such as investigations. However, these efforts are fragmented across six offices and IRS is missing opportunities to share information and better address risks. A comprehensive, coordinated preparer strategy, including efforts addressing ghost preparers, could help IRS better align resources with risks and identify additional needs. Notional Example of Fragmented Activities Compared to a Comprehensive, Coordinated Strategy While IRS has some activities to address ghost preparers, including data analysis and taxpayer education, it has not developed measurable objectives or performance goals. Defining objectives, goals, and performance measures could help IRS reliably assess whether its efforts are reducing ghost preparer activity and adjust its strategy and allocate resources more effectively. Why GAO Did This Study Paid tax preparers prepared more than half of all tax returns in fiscal year 2025 and have an enormous effect on IRS’s ability to administer tax laws effectively. However, ghost preparers may hide their identities to avoid accountability and leave taxpayers responsible for inaccurate or fraudulent returns they prepare. GAO was asked to examine IRS’s efforts to address ghost preparers. This report (1) describes how ghost preparers have harmed taxpayers and IRS, (2) assesses the extent to which IRS maintains data on ghost preparers, and (3) evaluates IRS actions to identify and address ghost preparers. GAO reviewed federal court cases, and IRS documentation and data. GAO compared IRS’s efforts to leading practices for evidence-based policymaking and consumer education planning. GAO also interviewed IRS and Department of Justice officials and stakeholder groups, such as IRS oversight and industry groups. Fri, 16 Oct 2026 07:28:51 -0400 /products/gao-27-108176 National Nuclear Security Administration: Reductions to Federal Workforce https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-27-109127 What GAO Found The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) oversees a $25 billion annual budget and approximately 70,000 management and operating contractor personnel to maintain the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and nuclear nonproliferation efforts. NNSA took steps to build its federal workforce to meet mission needs in 2024, with its workforce peaking at 1,991 early in fiscal year 2025. However, since then through the second quarter of fiscal year 2026, NNSA has reduced its federal workforce by 236 employees—or 11.9 percent. These reductions have impacted NNSA’s mission critical workforce, including occupations like nuclear engineers and contract specialists. Number of National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Federal Employees and Annual Appropriations, Fiscal Year (FY) 2023–FY 2026 Quarter (Q) 2 Note: The Federal Salaries and Expenses appropriation account funds the salaries, benefits, and other related expenses for most of NNSA’s federal workforce. The reduction of NNSA’s workforce occurred because of two primary reasons: (1) very limited hiring and (2) employee separations—primarily employees choosing to retire or resign. Hiring was limited during the second quarter of fiscal year 2025 through the first quarter of fiscal year 2026. Why GAO Did This Study NNSA—a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy (DOE)—has a current workload that is at its highest level since the Cold War as the agency oversees a $200 billion, 2-decades-long effort to modernize nuclear weapons and related infrastructure. In May 2024 (GAO-24-106167), GAO found NNSA continued to face challenges recruiting and retaining federal staff to meet the agency's mission needs, even though a statutory cap limiting the number of its federal employees was eliminated in fiscal year 2023. NNSA committed to developing a workforce planning process intended to inform future budget requests in response to its increased workload, the elimination of the cap, and consistent with GAO’s May 2024 report. The agency began building its workforce to meet mission needs in 2024. However, in response to presidential directives in early 2025, NNSA reduced the size of its federal workforce. GAO was asked to examine NNSA’s retirements, resignations, terminations, and other voluntary or involuntary workforce reductions since January 2025. This report describes changes to NNSA’s federal workforce from the beginning of fiscal year 2023 through the second quarter of fiscal year 2026. GAO analyzed relevant NNSA data for workforce and personnel actions, including hires and separations, by program, office, and location. GAO also reviewed NNSA budget information and interviewed NNSA officials. For more information, contact John Bumgarner at BumgarnerJ@gao.gov. Fri, 16 Oct 2026 07:24:19 -0400 /products/gao-27-109127 Critical Minerals: BLM Should Ensure Individuals and Businesses Meet Citizenship Requirements for Hardrock Mining Claims https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-27-108196 What GAO Found The Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Land Management (BLM) administers mining claims that grant the exclusive right to extract critical and other hardrock minerals from most federal lands. U.S. mining laws include citizenship requirements for individuals and business entities holding such claims, known as mining claimants. Under these laws, mining claimants generally must be U.S. citizens, which can include individuals as well as business entities incorporated in a U.S. state or territory. Foreign entities are not qualified to be claimants, but their subsidiaries can hold claims if they are incorporated in the U.S. Mining claimants are not required to disclose to BLM if they are a subsidiary of another entity, foreign or domestic, and they do not have to provide information on any foreign investment they may receive. Under BLM’s regulations and guidance, the agency collects basic identifying information from individuals and business entities holding mining claims. However, BLM generally does not collect citizenship information and does not document if mining claimants meet the U.S. citizenship requirements. In addition, BLM officials said the agency rarely verifies the citizenship of mining claimants. As a result, BLM generally does not know whether mining claimants are qualified to hold mining claims. Information the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) Collects from Mining Claimants GAO analyze

Reports News from the GAO Reports News from the GAO. https://www.gao.gov/rss/reports.xml Fri, 16 Oct 2026 11:50:10 -0400 GAO https://www.gao.gov/themes/custom/gao_uswds/img/gao-logo-rss.gif Reports News from the GAO https://www.gao.gov/rss/reports.xml Feed provided by GAO. 2027-2032 Strategic Plan: Serving Congress and the Nation https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-27-900655 GAO’s Strategic Plan Goals and Objectives form the foundation of the agency’s strategic plan and lay out our long-term strategies to accomplish our goals. For more information, contact Stephen Sanford at SanfordS@gao.gov. Fri, 16 Oct 2026 08:38:20 -0400 /products/gao-27-900655 Federal Real Property: New Occupancy Data Help Agencies Shed Unneeded Office Space But Gaps Limit the Full Picture https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-27-108503 What GAO Found Under the Utilizing Space Efficiently and Improving Technologies (USE IT) Act, enacted in January 2025, federal agencies are now required to collect and report occupancy data. This data is used to calculate utilization rates for agencies’ office space in federally owned buildings and leased locations. While 20 of the 23 agencies that responded to GAO’s survey reported using existing badging systems for this purpose, 16 of these 20 agencies reported supplementing that information with data from other sources such as daily check-in surveys. Nearly all agencies surveyed noted the importance of having easy to implement, cost-effective data collection approaches that they could put in place by the act’s July 2025 implementation deadline. Most agencies reported minimal costs associated with collecting and reporting USE IT Act data—collectively $16 million across 23 agencies in 2025. Agencies’ Use of Approaches to Collect Occupancy Data, as of September 2025 Many agencies told GAO they are either using or plan to use their USE IT Act data to identify and dispose of unneeded real property. Some agency officials told GAO that they have already made decisions to consolidate or dispose of underutilized spaces, informed in part by USE IT Act data, and that they expect to save millions of dollars annually as a result. However, the USE IT Act data submitted to Congress and the public in March 2026 does not have important context—including on GSA-controlled vacant space—needed to fully reflect office space utilization. Without this information, Congress and the public may have an inaccurate impression of the extent to which owned and leased office spaces are being utilized, including some locations that are likely being utilized at lower or higher rates than reported. While surveyed agencies generally agreed that USE IT Act data are helpful, about one-third expressed concerns about how GSA data collection and reporting guidelines affect their utilization rate calculations. Further, some agencies described approaches to collecting and reporting their occupancy data that are inconsistent with GSA guidelines, resulting in data that are incomplete. For example, one agency reported the number of employees that are assigned to each location rather than measuring the extent to which employees were present in those spaces. By coordinating with agencies to improve the consistency and completeness of their occupancy data, GSA could better position agencies to make informed decisions about which underused spaces to prioritize for disposal, potentially leading to tens of millions of dollars in financial savings. Why GAO Did This Study Chronic underutilization of federal buildings is one of the main reasons that the management of federal real property has been on GAO’s High Risk list for more than 20 years. The USE IT Act requires the 24 Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Act agencies to collect and report occupancy data on the number of employees working in certain owned and leased spaces. It also contains a provision for GAO to review the costs to these agencies of this requirement to measure the occupancy and utilization rates of their spaces. This report examines 1) the approaches CFO Act agencies reported using to collect the occupancy data required by the USE IT Act and their associated costs; 2) how agencies are using USE IT Act data to inform real property decisions and what additional information, if any, may help Congress and the public better understand federal office space utilization; and 3) agencies’ concerns about USE IT Act data collection and reporting and GSA’s actions to address these concerns. GAO surveyed the CFO Act agencies about their data collection approaches, associated costs, and any limitations to their data or selected approaches. GAO also reviewed GSA guidelines for USE IT Act data collection, analyzed GSA data on vacant spaces, and conducted in-depth interviews with five agencies selected based on the variety of approaches to collecting occupancy data and the size of their real property portfolios. Fri, 16 Oct 2026 07:18:45 -0400 /products/gao-27-108503 Critical Minerals: BLM Should Ensure Individuals and Businesses Meet Citizenship Requirements for Hardrock Mining Claims https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-27-108196 What GAO Found The Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Land Management (BLM) administers mining claims that grant the exclusive right to extract critical and other hardrock minerals from most federal lands. U.S. mining laws include citizenship requirements for individuals and business entities holding such claims, known as mining claimants. Under these laws, mining claimants generally must be U.S. citizens, which can include individuals as well as business entities incorporated in a U.S. state or territory. Foreign entities are not qualified to be claimants, but their subsidiaries can hold claims if they are incorporated in the U.S. Mining claimants are not required to disclose to BLM if they are a subsidiary of another entity, foreign or domestic, and they do not have to provide information on any foreign investment they may receive. Under BLM’s regulations and guidance, the agency collects basic identifying information from individuals and business entities holding mining claims. However, BLM generally does not collect citizenship information and does not document if mining claimants meet the U.S. citizenship requirements. In addition, BLM officials said the agency rarely verifies the citizenship of mining claimants. As a result, BLM generally does not know whether mining claimants are qualified to hold mining claims. Information the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) Collects from Mining Claimants GAO analyzed a nongeneralizable sample of 15 mining claimants that appeared to be business entities and could not find evidence that seven of the claimants were incorporated in the U.S., as required. BLM was unable to help determine if these entities met the requirement to be incorporated in the U.S. because it did not have the necessary information to do so. Until BLM directs staff to collect citizenship information and document that mining claimants meet the U.S. citizenship requirements, BLM lacks reasonable assurance that only qualified individuals and business entities hold mining claims that allow them to extract and profit from the minerals produced on federal lands. Australia and Canada—examples of top mineral-producing countries—collect detailed information on foreign investors in businesses in their countries. They can use this information to restrict foreign investments in mining and other sectors by prohibiting certain investments or imposing conditions, as each country has done in some cases in recent years. In addition, both countries limit the ability of foreign state-owned enterprises and other foreign investors to acquire control of businesses involving critical minerals. Why GAO Did This Study Critical minerals are vital to the U.S. economy and national security. Federal lands are a significant source of hardrock minerals and include some mining operations supported by foreign investments, according to BLM officials. The administration and Congress have expressed concern about U.S. reliance on foreign sources for critical minerals, and the President has called for expanding mineral production from federal lands. GAO was asked to review issues related to foreign entities’ involvement in mining on federal lands. This report examines (1) the extent to which BLM collects, documents, and reviews mining claimants’ citizenship information and (2) how selected mineral-producing countries address foreign investments in mining. GAO was also asked to report on the extent of foreign investment in mining on federal lands (see GAO-27-108094). GAO reviewed U.S. laws and regulations; analyzed a nongeneralizable sample of mining claimants to assess if they appear to meet citizenship requirements; examined BLM documents; visited three BLM state offices; and interviewed officials and representatives from BLM and other federal and nonfederal entities. GAO also reviewed Australian and Canadian laws, guidance, reports, and written responses to questions. Fri, 16 Oct 2026 07:40:59 -0400 /products/gao-27-108196 Service Member Records: DOD Needs to Address Improper and Delayed Releasing of Personnel and Health Information https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-27-107784 What GAO Found Service members can accrue a large volume of personnel and health records during their military careers. The custodians of these records are the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Veterans Affairs. DOD and the military services developed policies and procedures to properly adhere to federal laws for safeguarding records and timely processing records requests. However, the risk of breaches and delays exists. For example, GAO covertly tested 26 requests for records from DOD; of the 18 processed requests, one was improperly released and did not redact personally identifiable information. Examples of Breaches of Military Records Among Record Custodians Personnel records. The military services have procedures intended to safeguard records, such as redacting personally identifiable information. However, of the thousands of requests received during fiscal years 2021 through 2025, the services reported 49 breaches. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requires agencies to respond to requests within 20 business days, and Privacy Act requests are generally processed within 20 business days. According to military service officials, staffing limitations across the military services contribute to challenges with the proper and timely processing of records requests. For example, during the time of GAO’s review, the Navy had one employee processing FOIA requests, which officials stated contributed to an increased average processing time from 1.6 to 55.5 days. With a clearer understanding of the staffing levels needed to manage the volume and complexity of FOIA and Privacy Act requests, DOD and the services would be better prepared to improve response time, reduce the improper release of information, and minimize exposure to litigation costs. Health records. GAO found that the Defense Health Agency (DHA) relies on a complex record processing system to access service member health records, which leads to challenges in processing requests. Request processors identify health records among multiple data systems and review them to redact personally identifiable information. DHA officials stated that system issues and complex workflows challenged request processing. Multiple officials stated that the redaction process can be the most cumbersome part of fulfilling requests, particularly if the record is large or contains scanned documents. GAO previously reported that DOD determined the multiple legacy electronic health record systems that it implemented over the past 3 decades to manage patient health information required modernization, and that DOD sought to replace these legacy systems with a comprehensive electronic health record system. However, DOD has not assessed the current framework a

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