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Reports News from the GAO Reports News from the GAO. https://www.gao.gov/rss/reports.xml Thu, 15 Oct 2026 12:56:32 -0400 GAO https://www.gao.gov/themes/custom/gao_uswds/img/gao-logo-rss.gif Reports News from the GAO https://www.gao.gov/rss/reports.xml Feed provided by GAO. Artificial Intelligence: Actions and Opportunities to Implement Responsible Use in DOD https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-27-107837 What GAO Found Artificial intelligence (AI) is being used in a variety of scenarios, or use cases, in the Department of Defense (DOD). In guidance, DOD established AI Ethical Principles and the concept of Responsible AI to ensure the safety and trustworthiness of AI systems. DOD further defined six tenets to guide Responsible AI implementation. Most of the 10 DOD components GAO surveyed reported taking at least initial steps to establish oversight and implement Responsible AI tenets in the selected surveyed use cases. The Office of the Chief Digital and AI Officer (CDAO), through its Responsible AI Division, established the Responsible AI Working Council as the working-level collaborative group for Responsible AI. However, CDAO officials said the council did not meet from late 2024 until August 2025. Officials from four DOD components told GAO they faced Responsible AI implementation challenges during this time that would have benefited from collaboration. Six of 10 surveyed components reported that sharing Responsible AI resources and best practices would benefit their implementation efforts. Although officials said the council resumed meetings in August 2025, it is at risk of lapsing again as it does not have a charter that defines roles and responsibilities and specifies meeting frequency. Another lapse could increase the risk of DOD facing Responsible AI implementation issues, such as inconsistent interpretation of related guidance, that it would not have the collaborative capacity to swiftly and effectively resolve. CDAO officials identified additional actions that could help DOD implement Responsible AI. However, CDAO has experienced staffing shortages that have hindered its ability to take these actions. Specifically, officials said that as of February 2026, only three of the 10 authorized positions for the Responsible AI Division were filled. Responsible AI enables DOD to more quickly adopt AI. By addressing current workforce needs for the Responsible AI Division, CDAO could make more progress toward its goal of accelerating AI across DOD. GAO previously made recommendations on issues related to DOD’s AI collaboration and workforce. DOD has not fully addressed those recommendations. Congressional action to ensure that DOD takes steps to fully address those prior recommendations would help position the department to meet its AI goals. U.S. Marine Corps Service Members Conduct Training Using an Artificial Intelligence-Enabled System Why GAO Did This Study AI has changed the national security landscape. U.S. adversaries and competitors are investing heavily in AI and AI-enabled capabilities in ways that threaten global security. As DOD speeds AI development, it is critical for the department to do so responsibly so that warfighters can quickly and confidently adopt it. Senate Report 118-188 accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 includes a provision for GAO to review the implementation and oversight of DOD’s Responsible AI guidance, among other things. This report discusses DOD’s approach to the responsible use of AI, including related guidance, implementation, and oversight. GAO collected and reviewed DOD documentation related to Responsible AI. GAO also conducted a survey of 10 DOD components to understand how they have implemented Responsible AI tenets in 10 selected use cases. GAO also interviewed cognizant DOD officials. Wed, 14 Oct 2026 07:03:28 -0400 /products/gao-27-107837 Quantum Computing: Federal Actions Needed to Prepare for Emerging Cyber Threat [Reissued with revisions on Oct. 14, 2026] https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-27-108740 What GAO Found Quantum computers leverage qubits (the quantum equivalent of classical computer bits) to solve specific problems significantly faster than classical computers. However, the emergence of quantum computers could undermine the cryptography (e.g., encryption) that federal agencies use to secure their systems. Today’s quantum computers cannot yet break this cryptography. But a future quantum computer of sufficient size and sophistication—referred to as a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC)—could potentially do so for certain cryptography. Most industry experts believe that a CRQC will be developed, possibly as soon as the 2030s. However, development estimates vary widely due to several factors, such as uncertainty in the rate of growth for qubits and how many qubits will be needed. Once a CRQC is developed, its use could have devastating impacts to federal systems reliant on vulnerable cryptography. For example, a malicious actor could use a CRQC tocompromise systems that ensure the authenticity of system users—thus allowing the actor to gain access to sensitive information; and decrypt (or unlock and view) data that the actor acquires and stores prior to the development of such a computer. To address the threat posed by a CRQC, it is important that agencies transition existing systems to more secure cryptography (referred to as post-quantum cryptography). Using Office of Management and Budget guidance, GAO created an evaluation framework of three practices that agencies should address to prepare for this transition. However, none of the 24 selected agencies fully addressed these practices (see figure). Extent to Which the 24 Chief Financial Officer Act Agencies Addressed Preparatory Practices for Migrating to Quantum Computing The incomplete implementation of these practices is due in part to a lack of (1) cryptography expertise, (2) processes for developing cryptography inventories and identifying funding needed to transition to post-quantum cryptography, and (3) plans to guide post-quantum cryptography testing. Until the selected agencies address these weaknesses, they will not be well-positioned to address the threat of CRQCs to cryptography that agencies rely on to protect sensitive information. Why GAO Did This Study Federal agencies rely on cryptography to protect sensitive data and systems. However, some experts predict that a quantum computer capable of breaking certain cryptography may be developed within the next 10 to 20 years. GAO was asked to review the threat of quantum computing to federal agency cryptography. This report describes (1) the threats quantum computers pose to cryptography on federal agencies’ information systems and (2) the extent to which federal agencies have begun preparing for this threat consistent with federal guidance. GAO also evaluated cryptography inventories, funding assessments, and other planning documentation at each of the 24 Chief Financial Officer Act agencies to determine the extent to which they had addressed transition preparatory practices consistent with federal guidance. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in September 2025. GAO coordinated with the executive branch agencies included in this review from September 2025 through September 2026 to obtain concurrence that sensitive information was appropriately removed. Tue, 06 Oct 2026 07:20:40 -0400 /products/gao-27-108740 Department of Housing and Urban Development: 2025 Workforce and Spending Changes https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-108442 What GAO Found The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) reduced its workforce by 29 percent in 2025 and modified the types of programs it funds in response to presidential directives and executive branch guidance. HUD largely achieved workforce reductions through deferred resignation programs. Over half the employees who separated had at least 10 years of service at HUD, including 41 percent with more than 20 years of service. HUD did not publish notice of any reorganization plans that led to field office closures in 2025, though in 2026 it announced plans to consolidate one field office into a nearby regional office. Workforce Changes at the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in 2025 Note: Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding. About half of HUD’s 68 active grant programs made new awards in fiscal year 2025, but the median value of those awards was higher than in previous years. HUD also terminated about 21 percent of its active contracts in 2025, valued at about $367 million. Most terminated contracts involved professional or IT services. Representatives of 20 stakeholder organizations GAO interviewed—including fair housing grantees and agencies, public housing agencies, and Section 8 project-based rental assistance property managers—reported confusion, delays, and operational disruptions following HUD’s changes. Nearly all said that experienced points of contact had left, making it harder to navigate HUD programs. Fair housing stakeholders reported reducing services or staffing during monthslong funding gaps. Stakeholders also reported delays with physical inspections of HUD-assisted properties. Since January 2025, HUD has reported launching initiatives aimed at increasing efficiency and streamlining operations. For example, HUD reported developing a unified grants system to standardize grant administration and a project voucher initiative to automate aspects of rental assistance processing. HUD did not respond to GAO’s requests to discuss these initiatives or provide supporting documentation. As a result, Congress and the public have limited information on the status or effectiveness of these initiatives. Why GAO Did This Study HUD administers programs related to housing assistance, community development, and fair housing. To carry out these programs, HUD headquarters and field staff work with public housing agencies, private property owners, nonprofit organizations, and other stakeholders. Executive orders and other actions issued in 2025 called for workforce and program changes at HUD. GAO was asked to examine the effects of these changes. This report describes (1) changes HUD made to its workforce, field office structure, and grant and contract spending in 2025; (2) effects of those changes on selected HUD functions reported by housing stakeholders; and (3) steps HUD has publicly reported to manage the changes. HUD did not respond to GAO’s requests for information throughout the audit. GAO analyzed publicly available 2025 data on HUD’s workforce, terminated contracts, and grant spending. GAO selected three HUD functions for review, chosen to reflect a mix of funding levels and other criteria: (1) enforcement of the Fair Housing Act and Violence Against Women Act of 1994, (2) administration of the Section 8 Project-Based Rental Assistance Program, and (3) coordination of inspections of HUD-assisted properties. GAO also conducted four site visits and interviewed representatives of a nongeneralizable selection of 20 local and national housing organizations, including public housing agencies and fair housing organizations. GAO also reviewed court documents and publicly available data, and agency documentation related to HUD’s workforce and efficiency planning. For more information, contact Jill Naamane at naamanej@gao.gov. Wed, 14 Oct 2026 07:26:10 -0400 /products/gao-26-108442 Federal Law Enforcement: CBP and ICE Should Improve Body-Worn Camera Program Management https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-108157 What GAO Found Body-worn cameras provide law enforcement personnel with the capability to record interactions with the public. When initiating their body-worn camera programs, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) each developed a plan that included key components of a comprehensive program management p

Reports News from the GAO Reports News from the GAO. https://www.gao.gov/rss/reports.xml Fri, 16 Oct 2026 08:13:33 -0400 GAO https://www.gao.gov/themes/custom/gao_uswds/img/gao-logo-rss.gif Reports News from the GAO https://www.gao.gov/rss/reports.xml Feed provided by GAO. Critical Minerals: BLM Should Ensure Individuals and Businesses Meet Citizenship Requirements for Hardrock Mining Claims https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-27-108196 What GAO Found The Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Land Management (BLM) administers mining claims that grant the exclusive right to extract critical and other hardrock minerals from most federal lands. U.S. mining laws include citizenship requirements for individuals and business entities holding such claims, known as mining claimants. Under these laws, mining claimants generally must be U.S. citizens, which can include individuals as well as business entities incorporated in a U.S. state or territory. Foreign entities are not qualified to be claimants, but their subsidiaries can hold claims if they are incorporated in the U.S. Mining claimants are not required to disclose to BLM if they are a subsidiary of another entity, foreign or domestic, and they do not have to provide information on any foreign investment they may receive. Under BLM’s regulations and guidance, the agency collects basic identifying information from individuals and business entities holding mining claims. However, BLM generally does not collect citizenship information and does not document if mining claimants meet the U.S. citizenship requirements. In addition, BLM officials said the agency rarely verifies the citizenship of mining claimants. As a result, BLM generally does not know whether mining claimants are qualified to hold mining claims. Information the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) Collects from Mining Claimants GAO analyzed a nongeneralizable sample of 15 mining claimants that appeared to be business entities and could not find evidence that seven of the claimants were incorporated in the U.S., as required. BLM was unable to help determine if these entities met the requirement to be incorporated in the U.S. because it did not have the necessary information to do so. Until BLM directs staff to collect citizenship information and document that mining claimants meet the U.S. citizenship requirements, BLM lacks reasonable assurance that only qualified individuals and business entities hold mining claims that allow them to extract and profit from the minerals produced on federal lands. Australia and Canada—examples of top mineral-producing countries—collect detailed information on foreign investors in businesses in their countries. They can use this information to restrict foreign investments in mining and other sectors by prohibiting certain investments or imposing conditions, as each country has done in some cases in recent years. In addition, both countries limit the ability of foreign state-owned enterprises and other foreign investors to acquire control of businesses involving critical minerals. Why GAO Did This Study Critical minerals are vital to the U.S. economy and national security. Federal lands are a significant source of hardrock minerals and include some mining operations supported by foreign investments, according to BLM officials. The administration and Congress have expressed concern about U.S. reliance on foreign sources for critical minerals, and the President has called for expanding mineral production from federal lands. GAO was asked to review issues related to foreign entities’ involvement in mining on federal lands. This report examines (1) the extent to which BLM collects, documents, and reviews mining claimants’ citizenship information and (2) how selected mineral-producing countries address foreign investments in mining. GAO was also asked to report on the extent of foreign investment in mining on federal lands (see GAO-27-108094). GAO reviewed U.S. laws and regulations; analyzed a nongeneralizable sample of mining claimants to assess if they appear to meet citizenship requirements; examined BLM documents; visited three BLM state offices; and interviewed officials and representatives from BLM and other federal and nonfederal entities. GAO also reviewed Australian and Canadian laws, guidance, reports, and written responses to questions. Fri, 16 Oct 2026 07:40:59 -0400 /products/gao-27-108196 Federal Real Property: New Occupancy Data Help Agencies Shed Unneeded Office Space But Gaps Limit the Full Picture https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-27-108503 What GAO Found Under the Utilizing Space Efficiently and Improving Technologies (USE IT) Act, enacted in January 2025, federal agencies are now required to collect and report occupancy data. This data is used to calculate utilization rates for agencies’ office space in federally owned buildings and leased locations. While 20 of the 23 agencies that responded to GAO’s survey reported using existing badging systems for this purpose, 16 of these 20 agencies reported supplementing that information with data from other sources such as daily check-in surveys. Nearly all agencies surveyed noted the importance of having easy to implement, cost-effective data collection approaches that they could put in place by the act’s July 2025 implementation deadline. Most agencies reported minimal costs associated with collecting and reporting USE IT Act data—collectively $16 million across 23 agencies in 2025. Agencies’ Use of Approaches to Collect Occupancy Data, as of September 2025 Many agencies told GAO they are either using or plan to use their USE IT Act data to identify and dispose of unneeded real property. Some agency officials told GAO that they have already made decisions to consolidate or dispose of underutilized spaces, informed in part by USE IT Act data, and that they expect to save millions of dollars annually as a result. However, the USE IT Act data submitted to Congress and the public in March 2026 does not have important context—including on GSA-controlled vacant space—needed to fully reflect office space utilization. Without this information, Congress and the public may have an inaccurate impression of the extent to which owned and leased office spaces are being utilized, including some locations that are likely being utilized at lower or higher rates than reported. While surveyed agencies generally agreed that USE IT Act data are helpful, about one-third expressed concerns about how GSA data collection and reporting guidelines affect their utilization rate calculations. Further, some agencies described approaches to collecting and reporting their occupancy data that are inconsistent with GSA guidelines, resulting in data that are incomplete. For example, one agency reported the number of employees that are assigned to each location rather than measuring the extent to which employees were present in those spaces. By coordinating with agencies to improve the consistency and completeness of their occupancy data, GSA could better position agencies to make informed decisions about which underused spaces to prioritize for disposal, potentially leading to tens of millions of dollars in financial savings. Why GAO Did This Study Chronic underutilization of federal buildings is one of the main reasons that the management of federal real property has been on GAO’s High Risk list for more than 20 years. The USE IT Act requires the 24 Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Act agencies to collect and report occupancy data on the number of employees working in certain owned and leased spaces. It also contains a provision for GAO to review the costs to these agencies of this requirement to measure the occupancy and utilization rates of their spaces. This report examines 1) the approaches CFO Act agencies reported using to collect the occupancy data required by the USE IT Act and their associated costs; 2) how agencies are using USE IT Act data to inform real property decisions and what additional information, if any, may help Congress and the public better understand federal office space utilization; and 3) agencies’ concerns about USE IT Act data collection and reporting and GSA’s actions to address these concerns. GAO surveyed the CFO Act agencies about their data collection approaches, associated costs, and any limitations to their data or selected approaches. GAO also reviewed GSA guidelines for USE IT Act data collection, analyzed GSA data on vacant spaces, and conducted in-depth interviews with five agencies selected based on the variety of approaches to collecting occupancy data and the size of their real property portfolios. Fri, 16 Oct 2026 07:18:45 -0400 /products/gao-27-108503 Critical Minerals: Limited Available Information on the Full Extent of Foreign Investment in Mining on Federal Lands https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-27-108094 What GAO Found The U.S critical mineral supply chain faces numerous constraints, including the need for substantial capital investment and limited domestic processing capacity. The U.S. exports large quantities of domestically extracted ore to Canada, Mexico, and China, among other countries. Copper Mine on Federal Lands The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Forest Service oversee hardrock mines on federal land. As of February 2026, there were 632 approved hardrock mining plans of operation on federal land. The 1872 Mining Law generally requires mining claimants to be U.S. citizens or business entities incorporated in the U.S. Foreign businesses can meet this requirement by having a U.S. subsidiary serve as the claimant. While there is limited available information on the full extent of foreign investment in mining on federal lands and parent-subsidiary relationships, GAO reviewed ownership information of 43 claimants and operators associated with critical mineral mines on federal lands. GAO determined ownership for 32 of those companies and found that 14 were subsidiaries of foreign entities. GAO found that none of the 14 had Chinese-owned parent companies, but in at least two cases, Chinese entities had financial interest in the foreign parent companies. The 1872 Mining Law does not contain a provision requiring BLM or Forest Service to collect information on foreign parent companies nor does it require claimants or operators to submit information regarding foreign ownership. However, other federal agencies have some authorities and processes to identify foreign investment in mining. For example, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, chaired by the Department of the Treasury, can review foreign investment in mining as it relates to potential national security concerns. Why GAO Did This Study Critical minerals are essential to the economic and national security of the United States. These minerals, including copper, lithium, and zinc, are key components in advanced technologies and have vulnerable supply chains. As demand for these minerals increases, U.S. access to critical minerals has become a key topic in domestic policymaking and international relations. Recently, the administration and Congressional entities have expressed concerns over U.S. dependence on imports and the role of potential adversary nations, such as the People’s Republic of China (China), in the U.S. supply chain of critical minerals. Most critical minerals that can be mined in the U.S. are obtained through hardrock mining, some of which occurs on federal lands. However, policymakers have raised questions about the full amount and extent of foreign investment in those mines. This report provides information on hardrock mining that occurs on federal lands, foreign investment in mining on federal lands, and steps federal agencies take to identify foreign investment. It also provides information on the amount of extracted critical minerals exported from the U.S. from 2019 through 2025. GAO reviewed ownership information using a variety of sources for 43 claimants and operat

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